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UNDERSTANDING SPOKEN DISCOURSE – MS 4296 
 
F. Cornish, CNRS ERSS, UMR 5610 & Department of Language Sciences, University 




Spoken discourse is the ongoing, situated interpretation of a speaker’s communicative intentions, of 
which the addressee’s expected and actual reactions are an integral part. The creation of discourse is thus 
a joint endeavor, involving the active cooperation of all the participants. The textual record on which this 
constructive activity is based, in conjunction with the invocation of a relevant context, is constituted not 
only by the verbal content of the utterances produced, but also by non-verbal signals. According to Clark 
(1996), the text flow is divided between two simultaneously operative tracks: a primary “official 
business” track, and a secondary discourse-management track. Evidence for the existence and 
specialization of these two tracks is given via extracts from two radio broadcast discussions.  
 
1. Introduction: the contextual specificity of spoken interaction 
 
A characterization of spoken discourse requires a specification of the very different 
contexts of utterance which obtain in the production and reception of spoken and 
written discourse.  These configurations largely motivate the rather different properties 
of spoken and written discourse, even allowing for equivalence of register and 
formality: see the well-documented account of cross-language spoken syntax and 
discourse in Miller & Weinert (1998).  
Speech prototypically involves face-to-face interaction between two or more 
participants who share a spatio-temporal environment. This, together with a common 
cultural and personal background in the case of conversationalists who know each other 
well, provides a rich contextual common ground allowing the speaker to avoid having 
to verbalize a number of aspects of his or her message. Concomitantly, this common 
ground enables the discourse participants to rely to a large extent on non-verbal 
signaling, in tandem with and even, on occasion, in place of, the verbal textualisation of 
a given utterance.  Planning time, as well as “understanding” time, is naturally minimal 
and at a premium – and a great many features of spontaneous speech flow from this key 
factor.  Moreover, both speech and writing are normally designed by the user so as to be 
readily understood by the addressee (cf. the notion of “recipient design”). Indeed, 
according to Clark (1996) and other linguists, conversation and communication in 
general is a fundamentally joint activity, involving the active participation of the 
interlocutors and the  coordination of their actions (verbal as well as non-verbal).  
What I have just (very briefly) characterized is of course the prototypical 
instance of spoken interaction. There are obviously other less prototypical types of 
spoken discourse: for example, speaking on the telephone, where the participants share 
a time frame (adjusting for time zone differences when the call is international), but not 
a spatial one, where only two participants are involved, and where the communication is 
‘ear-to-ear’ rather than face-to-face (no non-vocal gestures or visual percepts are 
possible): see Drummond & Hopper (1991) for a discussion of miscommunication over 
the telephone; and speaking in a formal situation (a speech, lecture and so forth) in front 
of a group of people in circumstances where convention does not normally allow for 
verbal exchange and interaction.  
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In written discourse, on the other hand, there is by definition no common spatio-
temporal ground between the writer and their reader(s).  Since this is the case, and since 
inevitably there will be little or no opportunity to use non-verbal signals, the text used 
will need to be relatively explicit - since the textual input is confined to the verbal 
content, in conjunction with punctuation and various graphic devices. The much greater 
availability, in principle, of planning time allows the writer to review and to amend their 
written production.  
 
2. The context of spoken discourse, the distinction between text and discourse, and 
their roles in understanding 
 
It is useful in analyzing spoken (as well as written) discourse understanding to draw a 
three-way distinction between the dimensions of text, discourse and context. Definitions 
which I find helpful are given under (1) below (see Cornish, 1999: §2.3 and 2003: §2 
for further development and illustration of the ‘text’/’discourse’ distinction, and its 
importance for anaphora; also Edmondson, 1981: 4, Seidlhofer & Widdowson, 1999, 
and Werth, 1999: ch. 5 in connection with the notion ‘context’, on ‘Common Ground’ 
within his ‘Text Worlds’ framework):  
 
(1)   Text, discourse and context 
 
Text: the connected sequence of verbal signs and non-verbal signals in terms of which discourse 
is co-constructed by the participants in the act of communication.   
 
Discourse: the hierarchically structured, situated sequence of indexical, propositional, utterance 
and illocutionary acts carried out in pursuance of some communicative goal, as integrated within 
a given context.  
 
The context is subject to an ongoing process of construction and revision as the discourse 
unfolds.  It is through the invocation of a relevant context (which is partly determined by the 
nature of the co-text at issue, as well as by its genre) that the hearer or reader is able to convert 
the connected sequence of textual cues that is text into discourse. (Extract (slightly amended)  
from Cornish, 2003:3).  
 
 The text is the perceptible record of at least one utterance act (whether realized 
in terms of a verbal, linguistic trace or of a non-verbal trace - which may be gestural, 
sensory-perceptual or prosodic). See especially Clark’s (1996) chapter 6 on non-verbal 
signals and their different kinds of functions in discourse. Clark draws a highly relevant 
distinction between two simultaneously functioning textual “tracks” which operate in 
spoken discourse: a primary track, where the “official business” of the transaction at 
hand is being conducted; and a secondary “meta-discursive” or discourse management 
track, where participants make explicit the purposes and functions of the preceding and 
ongoing talk. The functions of either track may be realized via verbal and non-verbal 
signals (whether in tandem or individually). We shall be looking at examples of this 
dual-track structure in operation shortly. 
 The notion of text is close to what Gumperz (1992: 234) calls “contextualization 
cues”. The discourse partners make use of this record (a dual-track one, according to 
Clark, 1996), in conjunction with their invocation of a relevant context in cognitive 
terms, in order to create discourse.  
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 Discourse, on the other hand, refers to the hierarchically-structured, mentally-
represented product of the sequences of utterance, propositional, illocutionary and 
indexical acts which the participants are carrying out as the communication takes place. 
Such sequences have as their raison d’être the accomplishment of some particular 
overall communicative goal (see Parisi & Castelfranchi 1977). 
 The crucial point about this distinction is that discourse is a (re-)constructive, 
and therefore highly probabilistic enterprise: from the addressee’s perspective, it is by 
no means a question of simply directly decoding the text in order to arrive at the fully-
fledged message originally intended by the addressor. Indeed, the addressee actively 
contributes both to the text and to the discourse via their phatic signals, indications of 
(mis)understanding, and other reactions to the speaker’s moves. ‘Meaning’ does not lie  
“in” the text, it has to be constructed by the addressee (and the speaker!) via the text and 
an appropriate context (cf. Coupland et al., 1991: 5). In any case, the text is often, if not 
always, both incomplete and indeterminate in relation to the discourse which may be 
derived from it in conjunction with a context. 
  
3.  Some aspects of understanding spoken discourse 
 
3.1 Inferring propositional content and illocutionary force 
 
In what follows, I shall be examining instances of (mis)understanding which occur, and 
are manifest, within conversations. Thus it is the discourse participants themselves 
whose monitoring of the discourse being co-constructed is at issue here. I am adopting 
the principle that it is when misunderstandings, disagreements or disruptions generally 
are manifest in the textual record of a conversation that the way in which discourse 
normally operates may be seen most clearly (cf. Coupland et al., 1991). Let us analyze 
an initial occurrence of such a phenomenon. Here is a segment from the BBC Radio 4 
cultural discussion program Start the Week. The previous speaker (Caroline Quinn) has 
been arguing that the alienation of Black people in the United States is not due to a 
single factor, but has a variety of causes; that the situation is improving for all racial 
groups in the US, and that differences in degrees of integration into American society 
are in part due to differences in the “cultural inheritance” which each group brings with 
it. Homi Barber is then given the floor (for a second time) by the presenter, Melvin 
Bragg. Notational symbols used here are as follows: ‘-’: pause; ‘- -’ : double pause; 
upper case letters: strongly accented syllable; ‘[…]’: simultaneous speech; ‘=’: latching; 
‘(a)’: elision of “a”; ‘.hhh’ = sharp intake of breath. See Cameron’s (2001: 31-44) 
chapter 3 and Schiffrin’s (1994: 422-438) Appendix 2 for details of spoken discourse 
transcription. 
 
(2) HB:  Kate Kate – Caroline – you know I’m SURE you didn’t mean it but sometimes –  
cultural inheritance shades off into biological inheritance – in in the States you know 
people say .hhh – Blacks are in some – inherent way – inferior – an’  
there’s a lot of – a lot of a lot of stuff going around now of course – American Blacks  
came as slaves it’s not what they brought with them it was what they were not – Able 
to bring with them they were [snatched – no but - --   ]  
 CQ:         [it’s no – it’s nobody’s fault] = 
HB: = no I’m not saying it’s anybody’s fault – but I’m just saying you know that that’s the 
brute - historical - FACT… 
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In track 1 here, Caroline Quinn asserts that the fact that Black slaves were forced to sail 
to America without taking any of their possessions with them was not their fault (this is 
the proposition actually intended to be conveyed by the speaker here). It is no doubt the 
extreme sensitivity of the issue (racism towards Blacks) that has motivated the use of 
the indefinite negative with wide scope, nobody, here. (This is also the motivation for 
HB’s intake of breath in line 3, just before his presentation of the (racist) view of Blacks 
in America). And in track 2, the same speaker is rejecting what she sees as Homi 
Barber’s illocutionary stance in the extract – justifying and even seeming to condone the 
fact that Black people in the US are still not considered as “real” Americans. Barber’s 
response (in track 2) is to assert that this is not his view (notice his repetition of the verb 
say in “I’m (not) saying…”), but that the source of the way Black Americans are viewed 
today is an objective, historical fact; and in doing so, he is clearly rejecting Caroline 
Quinn’s implied interpretation of his illocutionary stance in his first turn.   
 
3.2 Inferring intended interactional moves and acts 
 
Occasionally, speakers and their addressee(s) disengage themselves from the discourse 
which they are creating, to establish meta-discursively what the relation is between their 
adjacent moves. This occurs in the “second” track, then, in Clark’s (1996) terms. When 
this happens, we get an explicit view of how the discourse participants are interpreting 
each other’s utterances (see also Cameron, 2001: 116). An example occurred during a 
discussion about “the Devil” in another edition of the BBC Radio 4 program Start the 
Week (22 April 1996). Here the presenter, Melvin Bragg (MB), is picking up on Peter 
Stanford’s characterization of the use of “the Devil” by the mediaeval Church as a 
means of social control: 
 
(3)       MB:  yes – the interesting thing is that was it already coercive an’ repressive – or did it 
   actually call out something that’s in people anyway – I mean the way you put it is that  
this is an authorit this is a Church behaving as the Church behaved in many many 
diff(e)rent ways – in great ways an’ in wicked ways – but this is a Church behaving in a 
very authoriTArian way – in saying “you will follow us – or we will er – we will – get 
you and we’ve got the man to get you – he’s called “the Devil”” – but – isn’t there 
something else there – isn’t it a rec(og)nition of what’s part of human nature and it was 
a BRILLiant metaphor – just as Christianity is full of brilliant metaphors as to what 
human nature is about so – .hhh it’s more positive in a way than [what you’re saying]  
PS:                       [well – well] it wouldn’t 
have worked would it – un un unless they were actually tapping into something that 
people wanted to believe – and if you think about it = 
   MB:                    = so you’re agreeing = 
 PS:  = I’m agreeing – but if you think about the – concept of evil… 
 
Melvin Bragg, in his first turn, is objecting to what he sees as a one-sided view of the 
status of the Devil in the mediaeval Church, according to Peter Stanford’s earlier 
characterization: he is espousing the view that, rather than “imposing” the Devil on 
believers in an authoritarian manner, the mediaeval Church more intelligently used the 
Devil as a metaphor for something that it recognized as already being part of human 
nature. Given that it is the former view which Melvin Bragg understands Peter Stanford 
to be adopting, he clearly expects him to disagree with his objection. Yet Stanford’s 
response is in conformity with this “objection”,  so it cannot count as a “disagreement”.  
As soon as Bragg realizes this, he interrupts Stanford’s response and asks him (via a 
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declarative request) for confirmation of this interpretation. Stanford then immediately 
gives it by repeating the “agreement” statement, then moves straight on to a 
development of the main point he had begun making at the point of interruption.  This is 
achieved via a repetition of the actual words of his preceding final utterance (with the 
conjunction and replaced by the adversative but): … and if you think about it… This is 
clear evidence of the “two-track” structure of textual development, as argued by Clark 
(1996), since the final conjunct of the pre-interrupted segment by Peter Stanford is 
repeated virtually verbatim immediately after the interruption. This indicates that the 
primary, “official business” track has not in fact been interrupted, but that it is the 




As Clark (1996) in particular emphasizes throughout his book, discourse is a joint 
endeavor, not the individual responsibility of the speaker, where the addressee has a 
merely passive role in decoding his/her utterances.  The textual record (verbal content of 
the utterances as well as meaningful gestures, prosody, phatic and other vocalizations) 
radically underdetermines the discourse which the participants are jointly constructing 
as the text unfolds in a particular context.  The discourse constructed at any given point 
in this unfolding is a tentative, probabilistic affair, and is not only subject to continual 
modification in terms of updating as each new utterance is encountered; but the 
immediately preceding discourse at a given point may also be revised and re-
constructed retroactively, as a function of a subsequent discourse act or move. This may 
occur when a participant, encountering another’s reaction to what s/he is attempting to 
say, realizes the latter has misunderstood their propositional content, illocutionary 
stance or the nature of their move (see the examples under (2) and (3) above).  In 
triggering this process of updating, revision and (re-)negotiation, discourse particles, 
vocal and visual gestures, pausing and prosody generally, all assume a crucial 
significance.  The dual-track structure of textualisation postulated by Clark (1996) 
makes possible this parallel management of the discharge of “official discourse 
business” (track 1), on the one hand, and the signaling of discourse organization (track 
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